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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to § 78 2a-
3(2)(h), Utah Code. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
i Xopellee is dissatisfied with the plethora of "Issues Presented for Review" 
found in Appellant's Brief as they obscure the two central issues in this case, whu . ire: 
Do the provisions oi \ •>-1>- ._,o.. < .. . • ;.- ;..
 4. ..? 
efteCw'. •. . ^arues, wmch 
re • :* pcrty and child support issues, to just three years, or 
do the terms oi such of an agreement continue until one party establishes 
a substantial change in circumstances? This issue was placed preserved in 
the tiidi ajiu' . * .; v.. . r 
[I- K, I II! | 
Was the trial court correct in determining there was not a substantial change 
in circumstances upon which to justify a modification of existing child 
support? T his issue was preserved in the trial i1 mi i 11 !n »ili Mi I )ienn [R. 
I ! ,uiil -li, I | iinl I - Ti lLmy |K \\ "\ I1 ! ] . 
1
 At the time Mr. Diener filed his original Petition to Modify, this provision was found 
in subsection (6) of the cited statute. It was subsequently renumbered to subsection (8). 
These provisions appear to be identical, so the current version is cited. 
1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
§ 78-45-7.2(8), Utah Code. Application of guidelines — Rebuttal. 
(a) If a child support order has not been issued or modified within the 
previous three years, a parent, legal guardian, or the office may petition the 
court to adjust the amount of a child support order. 
(b) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (8)(a), the court shall, 
taking into account the best interests of the child, determine whether there 
is a difference between the amount ordered and the amount that would be 
required under the guidelines. If there is a difference of 10% or more and 
the difference is not of a temporary nature, the court shall adjust the 
amount to that which is provided for in the guidelines. 
(c) A showing of a substantial change in circumstances is not necessary 
for an adjustment under Subsection (8)(b). 
§30-3-5(1) and (3) Utah Code. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health 
care of parties and children — Division of debts — 
Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody 
and parent-time — Determination of alimony — 
Nonmeritorious petition for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it 
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and 
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of 
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of the 
dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, 
an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of 
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the 
dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is 
responsible for the payment of joint debts, 
2 
obligations, or liabilities of the parties 
contracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify 
respective creditors or obligees, regarding the 
court's division of debts, obligations, or 
liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, 
current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these 
orders; and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with 
Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services. 
* * * 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, 
health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations 
for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Tiffany Jacobs meet Erich Diener in high school. Tiffany's parents were deceased, 
having been murdered when she was 7 years old. [R.220, p. 54]. At the time she met Mr. 
Diener, Tiffany was the beneficiary of a trust account left from her parents' estate that 
exceeded $100,000. [Id., p. 57]. She also had a life insurance policy that was purchased for 
her after her parents died [Id., p. 36]. Mr. Diener and Tiffany evidently hit it off because 
he too had lost a family member [Id, p. 55], so they both had common ground not shared 
with others. 
Mr. Diener became aware of Tiffany's assets and upon graduation asked Tiffany 
to pay the $5,000 tuition for him to spend a semester at Harvard University [Id, pp. 55-
3 
56]. By this time, the parties had discussed marriage and Mr. Diener told Tiffany that he 
considered this tuition a loan and in Tiffany's words, "it was an investment in him and 
our future together" [Id, p. 56]. In addition, Tiffany purchased a vehicle for Erich, a 
Toyota Land Cruiser. [Id., pp. 56-7] When it was sold, Mr. Diener repaid one-half of the 
purchase price and, according to Tiffany, expressed remorse that "he couldn't pay me 
back quite yet right now" [Id., p. 57]. Tiffany purchased a number of things for Erich's 
benefit prior to the marriage because Mr. Diener often talked her into buying such things, 
saying that he would pay Tiffany back later [Id., p. 58]. 
When Erich returned from Harvard, the parties lived together for a period of time 
[Id, pp. 9-10). By the time the parties got married on July 2, 1994 [R. 27], Tiffany's trust 
account was exhausted [R. 220, p. 57]. However, the cash value of Tiffany's life insurance 
policy was depleted during the marriage [Id., p. 36]. At the time the parties were married, 
Mr. Diener was in the U.S. Army [Id., p. 16]. The parties' child, Zoe, was born on 
February 19, 1995 [Id, p. 10]. 
While Mr. Diener was still in the Army, stationed at Ft. Mead, Maryland, the 
marriage appeared to be doomed and the parties began discussing the terms of a divorce 
[Id, p. 58]. Mr. Diener reviewed the matter at least once with a Judge Advocate General 
attorney at Ft. Mead, Maryland [Id, pp. 5, 16, 45]. As the parties addressed the terms of 
a divorce, Tiffany expressed concern that her trust fund had been depleted and she should 
4 
have much more to live on than the $400 in child support that Mr. Diener initially offered 
[Id., pp. 58-59]. Tiffany discussed her potential alimony and property claims but was 
persuaded by Mr. Diener not to pursue those claims in exchange for his payment of a 
higher amount of child support [Id., p. 59]. Mr. Diener admitted that he discussed with 
Tiffany the higher child support and his desire that Tiffany not pursue an alimony claim 
before the divorce [Id., p. 37]. Mr. Diener knew at the time he agreed to pay $400 per 
month that it was more than the Child Support Guidelines would have obligated him to 
pay [Id., p. 38]. After the parties agreed to the terms, Tiffany moved back to Salt Lake 
City and pursued the divorce action. [Id., p. 58]. 
Pursuant to their agreement, the parties entered into a stipulation whereby Mr. 
Diener agreed to pay $400 a month child support [R. 12]. Tiffany's attorney noted on the 
child support worksheet that this amount was greater than the guidelines called for and 
was set pursuant to the "Agreement of the parties." [R. 17]. At the time of the divorce, 
the Court found that Erich was earning $1,700 a month and Tiffany was earning a little 
less than $12.00 a month [R. 28]. 
In June, 1998, two months after the divorce, Mr. Diener began working for 
TEKsystems at $12.00 an hour, but his income steadily grew into a $55,000 annual salary 
[R.220, p. 19]. During this time, Mr. Diener never told Tiffany about his income and that 
he would pay additional child support [Id., p. 39]. When he lost his full-time job with 
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TEKsystems in September 2001, he received one month severance pay of $4,500 [Id., p. 
46]. Before he started his job with Tucci's restaurant in November, 2001, Mr. Diener 
traveled to Korea for at least two weeks visiting friends. This trip was paid for by his then 
current girlfriend. [A/., pp 39-41]. 
Shortly after Mr. Diener started working at Tucci's, he filed the present Petition 
to Modify on December 4, 2001 [R.43], which was served on January 3, 2002. In the 
petition, Mr. Diener alleged that he was a full-time student and that his current monthly 
income was $1,560 a month, including tips [R.44]. Discovery was undertaken, which 
closed on May 1,2002 [R. 85]. According to the facts presented to the trial court, as stated 
in Mr. Diener's brief (Appellant's Brief, pp. 14-5, fl 10-12, 14), Mr. Diener admitted that 
for a five month period between May and September of 2002, he worked for his old 
employer, TEKsystems, earning approximately $730 per month [Id., p. 24]. During that 
same period he earned between $200 to $300 per week at Tucci's [R. 220, p. 22], which 
extrapolates to approximately $860 to $1,290 per month. Since 2001 Mr. Diener had 
performed, and continues to perform, computer work for his attorney at $25 per hour, 
for which he received a IRS Form 1099 (miscellaneous income statement) for 2002 in the 
amount of $1,912.50 [Id, pp. 25-6]. This income averages approximately $160 a month. 
Therefore, for that five-month period between May and September, 2002, during the 
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pendency of his Petition to Modify following the close of discovery, Mr. Diener received 
income of between $1,751 and $2,281 per month. 
In September 2002 Mr. Diener then terminated his employment with Tucci's and 
enlisted in the Utah National Guard, receiving $250 per month [R. 220, p. 22]. In 
October, 2002 he terminated his employment with TEKsystems and in January, 2003 
took a job with The Gateway Academy, receiving about $240 per week [Id., pp. 24, 26-7. 
He continues as a full-time college student, now at the University of Utah [Id., p. 28]. This 
income, together with the work he continues to do for his attorney, shows Mr. Diener 
was earning about $1,450 a month at the time of trial. 
FACTS SUPPORTING THE TRIAL COURT'S 
RULING NOT MARSHALED BY THE APPELLANT. 
The following evidence is not cited by Mr. Diener in his Brief, but is evidence 
which supports the trial court's decision. 
1. Following service of his petition, Mr. Diener has not made the $400 a month 
child support payments, but has paid a lower amount based upon his admitted $1,750 a 
month income potential [R. 220, p. 32]. 
2. Mr. Deiner's assertion that he became aware "at some time during the entire 
proceedings" (Appellant's Brief, p. 8, 12; see also R. 220, p. 38) that the $400 per month 
child support amount he agreed to pay was greater than the guidelines is an incomplete 
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statement. Mr. Diener in fact admitted at trial that he knew before he signed the 
stipulation and the divorce was entered that this amount was more than the guidelines 
called for: 
Q. Okay. Now you had discussed with Tiffany the 
sum of $4 0 0 a month in child support back in November of 
'97, correct? 
A. I assume that's right. 
* * * 
Q. Okay, at the time you signed it, were you 
at that time aware that $400 was greater than the Child 
Support Guidelines would have ordinarily obligated you to 
pay? 
A. At some time during the entire proceedings I 
know I must have become aware of the fact that it was more. 
Q. Okay. 
A. So, when I signed i t , probably so. 
[R. 220, pp. 37, 38, emphasis added]. 
3. Through counsel, Mr. Diener stipulated prior to trial [R. 144] that the sum 
of $1,750 per month was his income for purposes of calculating child support. During the 
trial, his counsel stated: 
We've stipulated only for the purpose of 
calculating child support, that income can be 
imputed to him at $1,750 a month . . 
* * • 
The child support amount shall be based on one 
full-time job and that's why we are suggesting 
that we could impute it at $10 per hour as if 
he were working full-time for his current 
position. 
8 
[R. 220, pp. 67, 68].2 
4. As stated above, the worksheet submitted to the trial court before the 
divorce decree was entered showed that the $400 per month figure Mr. Diener agreed to 
pay for child support was greater than the guidelines and was arrived at pursuant to the 
"Agreement of the parties." [R. 17]. 
5. While Mr. Diener was earning $55,000 per year (which is nearly 270% more 
than his income at the time the divorce was entered) at TEKsystems, he never mentioned 
this to Tiffany and offered to pay more support [R. 220, p. 39]. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND 
§ 78-45-7.2(8), UTAH CODE, SHOULD NOT 
APPLY TO THE PETITION TO MODIFY. 
Because of Mr. Diener1 s promises made to Tiffany before and during the marriage 
[see, e.g. R. 220, pp. 43, 56, 57]— that he would make it up to her— when the parties 
2
 Mr. Diener occasionally attempts to qualify the stipulation by saying it was offered 
only if the trial court found that there was a substantial change of circumstances and if the 
trial court would indeed modify the child support provisions, which the trial court did 
not. Yet as shown above, there was ample evidence presented by Mr. Diener for the trial 
court to impute that amount of income to him despite his qualification, which the trial 
court noted it could do. [R. 220, p. 90]. The only time the stipulation came with 
qualifications was when it became apparent to Mr. Diener that trying to be clever might 
be more advantageous. 
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discussed divorce terms, Tiffany voiced her concerns about alimony, repayment of her 
lost pre-marital assets, and child support with Mr. Diener. In order to avoid Tiffany's 
claims for alimony and a property settlement, Mr. Diener agreed to pay a higher amount 
of child support [R. 220, p. 37, 59]. In keeping with their agreement, the Petition for 
Dissolution did not pursue these claims [R. 1-4] and the Stipulation signed by the parties 
contained the $400 per month child support figure. [R. 10-16]. This evidence persuaded 
the trial court that "the amount of child support was a bargained-for consideration in 
which concessions were made." [R. 220, p. 94-5]. 
In his Petition to Modify, Mr. Diener alleged that he was earning $1,560 per month 
and that there was a substantial change in circumstances [R. 44, 46]. However, his 
position soon changed when it became obvious that his income had not changed enough 
to prove a substantial change in circumstances. Thereafter, Mr. Diener adopted the 
argument that the three-year review provisions now found in § 78-45-7.2(8), Utah Code, 
should apply to his request, relieving him of any obligation to show a substantial change 
in circumstances, because three years had passed since the initial divorce decree. However 
the trial court found that the parties bargained for the higher child support amount in 
exchange for Ms. Diener not pursuing alimony and property settlement claims [R. 203]. 
§ 78-45-7.2(8) does not attempt to limit equity and established case law regarding 
bargained-for provisions in a divorce decree. There are a number of Utah cases that affirm 
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such provisions. These cases require a showing of a substantial, or material, change in 
circumstances to modify a bargained-for terms in a decree. 
[W]hen a decree is based upon a property settlement 
agreement forged by the parties and sanctioned by the court, 
equity must take such agreement into consideration. Equity 
is not available to reinstate rights and privileges voluntarily 
contracted away simply because one has come to regret the 
bargain made. 
Landv. Land, 605 P.2d 1248, 1250-51 (Utah 1980) (footnote citations omitted). 
In a case with some parallels to Mr. Diener's argument here, the supreme court in 
Despain v. Despain, 627 P.2d 526 (Utah 1981), quoted the Land opinion in rejecting an 
attempt by a divorced father to modify a stipulated child support obligation that required 
his payment of child support so long as the children resided with their mother and were 
full time students. The father argued that § 15-2-1, which establishes the age of majority 
at 18 but also conferred power on courts in divorce actions to award child support to age 
21, mandated that his stipulated obligation should end upon the children reaching that 
age—regardless of whom they lived with or if they were still enrolled in school. The court 
held: 
Defendant has failed to observe the distinction between those 
cases involving the statutory power of the court in a divorce 
proceeding to enter orders concerning support and those cases 
in which the parties in a divorce action have settled their 
property rights by agreement, the terms of which are 
incorporated in a decree. The limitations on the power of the 
court to order support do not limit the rights of the husband 
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and wife to contract with respect to the education of their 
children as part of an agreement settling their property rights. 
A husband who has undertaken an obligation in consideration 
of the provisions of the property settlement agreement which 
were for his benefit, cannot subsequently complain that the 
court, in the absence of such agreement, would have been 
without power to order him to do so. 
627 P.2d, at 527. 
In Hill v. Hill, 841 P.2d 722 (Utah App. 1992), this Court quoted Land to uphold 
a stipulated child support order to provide extra payments during college enrollment. 
After noting "both parties made concessions in exchange for their respective benefits," 
this Court held that "it would be highly inequitable to permit Mr. Hill to retain the 
benefits and be relieved of the obligations he assumed in his bargain to Mrs. Hill." 
Also quoting Land, this Court in Thornbladv. Thornblad, 849 P.2d 1197, 1198-9 
(Utah App. 1993), noted "the equitable nature of child support proceedings." 849 P.2d., 
at 1198. This Court also observed that "[b]oth parties undoubtedly made concessions for 
their respective benefits." 849 P.2d, at 1199. However, due to a substantial change in the 
parties financial circumstances the appeals court upheld the trial court's modification to 
terminate child support early. 849 P.2d, at 1199-1200. 
Like these reported cases, the parties in the present case entered into a binding 
agreement that they initially honored; Mr. Diener agreed to pay a higher amount of child 
support to be relieved of a fight over alimony and a return of Tiffany's premarital assets 
12 
that he used before and during the marriage while promising to return it in some fashion. 
In return, Tiffany agreed to forgo such claims and accept a higher amount of child 
support. It would be highly inequitable, and inappropriate, for Mr. Diener to rely solely 
on a new statute to retain the benefit of his bargain, i.e., not having to defend claims for 
a return of Tiffany's pre-marital property, and avoid his concomitant obligation, i.e., to 
pay a higher amount of child support. 
As our supreme court has more recently held: 
. . . the general principle derived from our case law is that 
spouses or prospective spouses may make binding contracts 
with each other and arrange their affairs as they see fit, insofar 
as the negotiations are conducted in good faith . . ., and do 
not unreasonably constrain the court's equitable and statutory 
duties. 
Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, 984 P.2d 987, 994-5, 1 25. There is no indication that by 
adopting § 78-45-7.2(8) the legislature intended to limit the trial court's "equitable" 
powers, or a court's "continuing jurisdiction" to consider changes to child support that 
may be "reasonable and necessary." § 30-3-5(1) and (3), Utah Code. "The modification of 
divorce decrees is a matter of equity." Christensen v. Christensen, 628 P.2d 1297, 1299 
(Utah 1981). 
At the close of trial, the trial stated that the application of the automatic 3 year 
evaluation period would not be in Zoe Diener's best interests [R. 220, p. 95; R], which is 
fully consistent with equity and the provisions of § 7845-7.2(8). Consequently, the trial 
13 
court's conclusion that application of this statute would be inequitable under the 
circumstances [R. 206] is not error. 
II. 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SHOW A SUBSTANTIAL 
CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES BY WHICH MR. DIENER 
CAN REDUCE HIS CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION. 
By agreeing that his income may be imputed at a level slightly higher than it was 
at the time of the decree,3 Mr. Diener has waived any claim that he has suffered a 
substantial change in his own financial circumstances, which itself should put an end to 
his appeal. The evidence presented to the trial court indeed established that Mr. Diener 
had been earning, just a few months before the trial, between $50 and $581 more per 
month than at the time of divorce. He argued at trial that his post-discovery, last-minute 
job changes, despite his agreement to impute income at a higher amount than he earned 
at the time of divorce, are a substantial change in circumstances that justifies a lowering 
of his stipulated support obligation. However, the trial court had ample evidence to 
3
 Which was true for a 5 month period during the pendency of Mr. Diener's petition 
before the district court. 
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impute income to Mr. Diener in excess of his income at the time of the divorce, see page 
5, above.4 
Mr. Diener also argues that the trial court erred in failing to consider Tiffany's 
unemployed status as a full-time student as a substantial change in circumstances that 
would justify a reduction in support. Apparently Mr. Diener believes for this reason 
alone he should be entitled to a 40% reduction in his child support obligation. Petitioner 
has been unable to locate any case law that suggests that where the non-custodial obligor 
is earning or is capable of earning more than he made at the time of the divorce, he still 
can reduce the child support base solely upon the negative change in circumstances of the 
custodial obligee. But even such cases could be found, Mr. Diener's argument has a fatal 
flaw. 
In his closing argument, Mr. Diener's counsel indicated that Mr. Diener sought a 
reduction from $400 per month to $239 per month for child support. The trial court 
asked if "the 239 is based on imputing income to her as well?" Mr. Diener's counsel 
responded "That's correct." [R. 220, p. 67]. The only evidence as to Tiffany's income was 
her acknowledgment [R. 220, at p. 5-6] of the findings made by the court at the time the 
divorce was entered [R. 28], that she made $1,192 per month as a nanny. Thus, assuming 
4
 Mr. Diener makes much of the fact that he was a full time student at the U of U at the 
time of trial. However, he was a full-time student at the time his petition was filed, and 
was able to earn more than his income at the time of divorce during the proceedings 
before the trial court, so his student status —for all practical purposes— is irrelevant. 
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the court imputed income to both Mr. Diener (either by stipulation without the 
convenient qualification Mr. Diener urges or by virtue of his admitted income history) 
and to Tiffany, the trial court would have imputed at least $1,750 monthly income to Mr. 
Diener pursuant to § 78-45-7.5(7)(a), Utah Code, and $1,192 to Tiffany pursuant to § 78-
45-7.5 (7) (b). Consequently, there would be absolutely NO change in financial circumstances 
for either party] Mr. Diener thus puts the trial court in an impossible situation, asking it 
to impute income that is virtually unchanged from the amounts earned at the time of 
decree, and then claiming the trial court erred in failing to find a substantial change in 
circumstances. Parties may not "take advantage of self-invited error." Curry v. Curry, 321 
P.2d 939, 950 (Utah 1958). 
Even if this Court were to consider the every-three-year-modification provision of 
§ 78-45-7.2(8) as obviating the requirement that he prove a substantial change, Mr. Diener 
will be hard-pressed to establish, pursuant to § 78-45-7.2(8)(b), that it would be in "the 
best interests" of his minor daughter for her father to pay significantly reduced child 
support payments because the custodial parent is not earning any income. The cases cited 
by Mr. Diener do not come close to addressing this circumstance. For instance, in Little 
v. Little, 975 P.2d 108 (Ariz. 1999) the father left the Air Force and enrolled in law school 
"rather than seek employment." 975 P.2d, at 110. There was no discussion of the 
mother's income. However, the Arizona court did endorse the Vermont Supreme 
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Court's observation that the "responsibilities of begetting a family many times raises 
havoc with dreams. Nevertheless, the duty [to support one's children] persists, with full 
authority in the State to enforce it." 975 P.2d at 114 (quoting Romano v. Romano, 340 
A.2d 63, 64 (Vt. 1975)). Any judicial embrace of Mr. Diener's positions would turn 
equity on its head and punish children whose parents agreed to a higher amount of 
support and can earn the same income, or more, that they did at the time of the divorce. 
Mr. Diener's argument that this Court "should determine that an obligor's decision 
to return to school might ultimately benefit the child" (Appellant's Brief, p. 35-6) 
(emphasis added) is interesting. However, it is only argumentative speculation— 
completely unsupported by any evidence—that misses the point. Mr. Diener has not 
established that his enrollment in school comes at the expense of his ability to earn the 
same income he earned at the time of the divorce. Instead, he proved during this case that 
he can earn the same amount, or more, while a full-time student. While Zoe might benefit 
in the future from Mr. Diener's return to school, she should continue to benefit now 
from his present ability to earn at least as much as he did at the time of the decree. 
Finally, this Court "may affirm the judgment on any ground, even one not relied 
upon by the trial court." White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1376 (Utah 1994). 
"However, any rationale for affirming a decision must find support in the record." Hill 
v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 1992). Mr. Diener admitted he did not 
17 
tell Tiffany he was earning $55,000 a year nor offer to pay more support during that 
period of time [R. 220, p. 39]. Therefore, he does not qualify to seek equity by claiming 
it should now be reduced. 
It is inherent in the nature and purpose of equity that it will 
grant relief only when fairness and good conscience so 
demand. Correlated to this is the precept that equity does not 
reward one who has engaged in fraud or deceit in the business 
under consideration, but reserves its rewards for those who 
are themselves acting in fairness and good conscience, or as is 
sometimes said, to those who have come into court with clean 
hands. 
Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 1977). The trial court's decision not to 
modify child support can be separately affirmed by application of the doctrine of clean 
hands. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court properly found that Tiffany would be denied the benefit of her 
bargain, having given up alimony and property settlement claims, if § 78-7.2(8) were 
interpreted in such a way as to allow Mr. Diener to avoid the obligations of his 
agreement. Contrary to his argument that "pursuant to the Court's ruling, Mr. Diener 
can never adjust that amount" (Appellant's Brief, p. 37), Utah case law indeed allows for 
bargained-for agreements to be modified upon a showing of substantial change in 
circumstances. While neither party is prevented from trying to prove a substantial change 
in the future to either decrease or increase child support, Mr. Diener has been unable to 
18 
make that showing now, nor does he qualify to do so. Therefore, Tiffany requests this 
Court affirm the district courts Order and award Tiffany her fees and costs incurred 
herein. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this c^Y day
 Qf October, 2003. 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT, L.C. 
JOHN W. CALL 
corney for Petitioner/Appellee 
*iffany Jacobs Diener 
19 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
this BRIEF OF APPELLEE J ^ / d a y of October, 2003, by U. S. Mail, postage prepaid, 
to the following: 
Brian M. Barnard 
Utah Legal Clinic 
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellant Erich Ross Diener 
214 East Fifth South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2304 
20 
APPENDIX "A" 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET 
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